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SYMPOSIUM
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND THE BRAIN: WHEN
LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE COLLIDE
FOREWORD
Deborah W. Denno*
INTRODUCTION
This Foreword provides an overview of Criminal Behavior and the Brain:
When Law and Neuroscience Collide, a symposium hosted by the Fordham
Law Review and cosponsored by the Fordham Law School Neuroscience and
Law Center. While the field of neuroscience is vast—generally constituting
“the branch of the life sciences that studies the brain and nervous system”1—
this symposium focused on the cutting-edge ties between neuroscience
evidence and the different facets of criminal law. Such an intersection invited
commentary from an expert group on a wide span of topics, ranging from the
historical underpinnings between law and neuroscience to the treatment of
young adults to the different roles of neuroscience in the context of
sentencing, expert testimony, defenses, prediction, punishment, and
rehabilitation, as well as the civil and criminal divide. These diverse subjects
have an overarching theme in common: each pertains in some way to the
criminal justice system’s effort to punish or rehabilitate more fairly and
effectively.

* Arthur A. McGivney Professor of Law, Founding Director, Neuroscience and Law Center,
Fordham University School of Law. This Foreword reviews the Fordham Law Review
symposium entitled Criminal Behavior and the Brain: When Law and Neuroscience Collide
(cosponsored with the Fordham Law School Neuroscience and Law Center) held at Fordham
Law School. I am most grateful to the symposium participants for their insightful
interdisciplinary presentations as well as their articles published in this issue. I also thank the
members of the Fordham Law Review for their incredible care and thought in organizing the
symposium and the editorial process. Marianna Gebhardt and Erica Valencia-Graham
provided excellent comments and assistance for this Foreword. I am indebted to Fordham
Law School and the Gerald Edelman Fellowship for funding.
1. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE glossary at
206 (Brent Garland ed., 2004); see also OWEN D. JONES ET AL., LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 762
(2014) (defining neuroscience as “[t]he scientific study of the structure and function of the
nervous system; includes experimental and clinical studies of animals and humans”).
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I. NEUROSCIENCE AND LAW:
HISTORY AND FRAMEWORK
Any informed discussion of criminal behavior and the brain must start with
a historical overview of the use of neuroscience in the courtroom. Francis
Shen’s article focuses on developments in this area that have occurred over
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.2 Shen contends that current studies
of neuroscience and law should incorporate greater awareness of this history
given the ways in which the past may illuminate the present.3 While brain
science can improve the law, there always have been limits to how much
science can resolve legal problems.4
Shen examines four sequential and overlooked “moments”5 in history: (1)
the communications between medicine and law in the nineteenth century and
the early twentieth century, (2) the start of the legal system’s use of
electroencephalography evidence in the mid-twentieth century, (3) the
application of psychosurgery as a means of averting an individual’s violent
behavior during the 1960s and 1970s, and (4) the developing use of
neuroscience in personal injury cases in the late 1980s and throughout the
1990s.6 Although the science during these moments has not always been
successful in achieving its goals, much has been written on issues such as
eugenics, phrenology, the frontal lobotomy, and what the past use of these
techniques might predict for today.7
The law’s engagement with the lobotomy in the 1940s and 1950s is
perhaps the most concerning development in this area.8 Shen examines the
most troubling aspects of this practice, both in modern times and decades
ago,9 particularly in the context of racial unrest and urban riots.10 Yet, he
acknowledges that “[p]sychosurgery made national headlines but never made
much headway in the actual criminal justice system.”11
The surge of forensic neuropsychology in civil litigation in the 1990s had
a different outcome, however. It provided a foundation for current advances
in the intersection between neuroscience and law12 as awareness grew of the
increasing number of neuropsychologists testifying in court cases.13 Shen
concludes by explaining that, while the history of neuroscience and law is
generally problematic, underexplored, and incautious,14 “we are in the

2.
(2016).
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Francis X. Shen, The Overlooked History of Neurolaw, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 667
Id. at 667–68.
Id. at 668.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 680–81.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 682–83.
Id. at 683–84.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 685–86.
Id. at 691–92.
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middle of a revolution in neuroscience”15 that brings with it ever-increasing
growth and interest in brain research.16 Shen’s article is a call to action,
inviting readers to “learn from our past mistakes, build on our past successes,
and forge a future of increasingly productive interdisciplinary
conversation.”17
Elizabeth Bennett’s article also provides some historical perspective but
centers on more recent developments, from the 1980s to the present,
primarily within the retributivist versus consequentialist context.18 While
Shen focuses on the evolution of neuroscience prior to and during the initial
stages of its use in courtrooms, Bennett is concerned more with developing
theories that underlie the link between law and neuroscience and how
neuroscience is currently employed in courtrooms (to mitigate sentencing).19
Bennett begins by assuming that “[m]oral responsibility is the foundation
of criminal law,”20 and she raises the question of whether advances in
neuroscience and brain imaging will weaken or even dissolve that
foundation.21 To probe this issue, Bennett first describes the history and
evolution of criminal law over time,22 noting that, although the criminal law
varies in different societies and cultures, each system shares two key
principles: (1) defendants must have some level of intent to be culpable for
a criminal act and (2) the punishment the state provides will be proportional
to that level of intent.23 Bennett posits that neuroscience will help to ensure
these two principles are enacted in a way that is more accurate and fair.24 She
claims that “[a] fair sentencing regime” requires both retributivist and
consequentialist principles.25
So far, prosecutors have not used neuroscience evidence to predict a
defendant’s future violent behavior or recidivism nor to argue for longer
sentences and preventive detention.26 Yet it remains to be seen whether
prosecutorial practices will change as neuroscience evidence becomes more
accepted.27 Likewise, many researchers in the fields of neuroscience and law
anticipate that neuroscience will take a more significant role in identifying
and explaining brain disorders that show a greater link to a defendant’s
criminal conduct and mental state, including substance abuse addiction and
defenses such as insanity.28
15. Id. at 692 (quoting Henry T. Greely, Law and the Revolution in Neuroscience: An
Early Look at the Field, 42 AKRON L. REV. 687, 688 (2009)).
16. Id. at 693.
17. Id. at 695.
18. Elizabeth Bennett, Neuroscience and Criminal Law: Have We Been Getting It Wrong
for Centuries and Where Do We Go from Here?, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (2016).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 437.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 437–39.
23. Id. at 439–40.
24. Id. at 440.
25. Id. at 444.
26. Id. at 449.
27. Id. at 450.
28. Id.
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Given these and numerous other potential uses for neuroscience in the
criminal justice system, Bennett lists ways in which the criminal justice
system could change.29 For example, developments in neuroscience could
expand or increase the number of excuses, including the ability to better
identify those who should receive insanity verdicts.30 In light of these and
other possibilities, Bennett concludes by highlighting the enormous impact
that neuroscience may have on the criminal justice system: if neuroscience
“does eventually provide significant insights into the mind, it may well be
necessary to revamp our thinking on the Anglo-American system of criminal
justice and perhaps our approach to the law entirely.”31
II. NEUROSCIENCE AND SENTENCING POLICY
The potential role for neuroscience in law is perhaps most frequently
discussed in the context of sentencing. Like Bennett, Nancy Gertner
examines how neuroscience offers the possibility of yet another shift in
American sentencing by aiding the development of a more informed
sentencing approach.32 She begins with an overview of the history of
sentencing and how changes throughout that history (such as the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984) have altered judges’ approaches.33 Gertner writes from
a highly personal perspective, given her seventeen-year federal judicial
career; she explains that she is currently “reviewing the sentences [she] was
obliged to give to hundreds of men—mostly African American men”—
during the course of her years on the bench.34 Her initial conclusion is
striking: “I believe that 80 percent of the sentences that I imposed were
unfair, unjust, and disproportionate.”35 All the factors that she and
neuroscientists have discovered to impact behavior were “irrelevant to the
analysis [she] was supposed to conduct.”36
With that bold start, Gertner views the topic of neuroscience and
sentencing from three perspectives: (1) the “sentencer’s brain” and all that
the sentencer experiences, (2) the “sentencing stage” and the kinds of rules
that control it, and (3) the “substantive content” that neuroscience can
contribute to sentencing.37 She explains that, for the past thirty years, the
sentencer’s brain has concentrated exclusively on retribution and sentencing
disparity between judges, thereby buffering a “rigid, formulaic, and severe”
sentencing scheme.38 The past decade’s growing recognition of problems
associated with mass incarceration, racial inequities, and high prison costs
have prompted the concept of a “new rehabilitation” guided by

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 450–51.
Id. at 451.
Id.
Nancy Gertner, Neuroscience and Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 533 (2016).
Id. at 534–41.
Id. at 533.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 533–34.
Id. at 534.
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neuroscience.39 Gertner emphasizes, however, that this “new rehabilitation”
must avoid the problems of the past.
Gertner provides a detailed critique of the Sentencing Reform Act and the
new agency it started, the U.S. Sentencing Commission.40 Because the U.S.
Sentencing Commission lacked sentencing experts and produced
unsophisticated research, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“the
Guidelines”) were ill informed and devoid of purpose.41 Indeed recent
neuroscience research has shown the negative effects the Guidelines have
imposed on judicial decision making and the unfairness it creates in
sentencing.42 According to Gertner, the goal is to devise a system that
enables judicial discretion and judgment while also bypassing the hazards of
the pre-Guidelines flaws.43 “This would be a system informed by appellate
review, and even peer review, with evidence-based guidance from
neuroscience, social psychology, and psychiatry—not mandatory diktats.”44
Such a system would also address the problems that accompany expert
sentencing at trial and the need to strengthen procedural protections in
noncapital cases.45
The “new rehabilitation” therefore provides opportunities for the criminal
justice system to shun retribution in lieu of a regime more neuroscientifically
suitable to defendants’ individual needs.46 In addition, neuroscience findings
can shed light on a range of other troubling challenges that impact offenders,
including inadequate prison conditions, solitary confinement, prison
violence, and issues pertaining to juveniles.47 While neuroscience research
also can help assess which programs succeed or fail,48 Gertner warns that
there are drawbacks to relying on neuroscience evidence.49
Gertner ends by emphasizing the special role that neuroscience plays in
sentencing determinations.50 Instead of using neuroscience evidence to
assess defendants’ culpability or whether they should be executed, “ordinary
sentencing” should be “forward looking, considering recidivism, deterrence,
and rehabilitation.”51 In focusing on defendants’ futures, the criminal justice
system “should use all of the new tools at [our] disposal, so long as [we]
understand[] the history and risks.”52
Bernice B. Donald and Erica Bakies consider more specifically how
neuroscience has been incorporated during the sentencing process, as well as

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 535.
Id. at 536–37.
Id.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 544–45.
Id.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 546.
Id.
Id.
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the tools that courts evaluate, such as neuroimaging.53 Their article also
discusses how neuroscience can help judges overcome their implicit biases.54
Like the Gertner article, Donald and Bakies’s article provides a thorough
background on the current and perhaps future role of neuroscience in judicial
decision making.55
The authors begin by asking how neuroscience evidence could be
effectively applied in the context of sentencing.56 Their answer provides the
article’s theme that neuroscience can be used to show how certain actions
may result from developmental problems associated with the brain, like the
effects of complex trauma on children.57 The authors’ approach is consistent
with current trends and efforts in neuroscience, including President Barack
Obama’s launch of the Brain Research through Advancing Innovative
Neurotechnologies Initiative.58 As a consequence, fields of study concerning
the brain (such as neuropsychology) have grown substantially59 and have
enhanced the perspective and evidence that neuroscience provides.60 This
expanded multidisciplinary view can include measures ranging from brain
scans to social and family histories61 as well as neuroscience research
demonstrating how childhood trauma can impact brain development and
behavior.62
In order to provide perspective on these issues, the authors examine the
history of sentencing in the United States from the seventeenth century
through the 1980s, when sentencing centered on deterrence and
incapacitation in light of the War on Drugs.63 While judges initially
possessed nearly unlimited sentencing discretion,64 this lack of oversight
changed in 1984 when Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, which
established the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.65 Donald and Bakies note that, although the Guidelines are no
longer mandatory, they continue to have a negative effect on those who are
mentally ill.66
The authors also examine how neuroscience is currently incorporated
within the criminal justice system, noting that it has been introduced in all
three phases of a criminal trial: competency determinations, the guilt phase,

53. Bernice B. Donald & Erica Bakies, A Glimpse Inside the Brain’s Black Box:
Understanding the Role of Neuroscience in Criminal Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 481
(2016).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 481.
57. Id. at 481–82.
58. Id. at 482–83.
59. Id. at 483.
60. Id. at 483–87.
61. Id. at 484.
62. Id. at 485–87.
63. Id. at 488–92.
64. Id. at 489.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 490.
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and the sentencing phase.67 In civil cases, claims using neuroscience have
covered a wide range of areas including personal injury, medical malpractice,
and toxic exposure68—associations that can also be relevant in the criminal
context. While most jurisdictions accept a neuropsychologist’s testimony
concerning the link between an existing brain injury and causation, a minority
of states exclude it on the basis that only medical experts are qualified to
testify on the relevant diagnostic and causal issues.69 Still, neuroscience
evidence is readily admitted into courtrooms and it plays a substantial role in
mitigating factors applicable to the death penalty.70 Indeed, cognitive
scientists are now assisting defendants’ mitigation arguments “‘by invoking
cutting-edge brain imaging research on the neurobiological roots of criminal
violence’ within offenders’ brains.”71 This approach is consistent with the
U.S. Supreme Court’s standard in death penalty cases that the sentence reflect
the “uniqueness of the individual” and “a reasoned moral response to the
defendant’s background, character, and crime.”72
There are also a number of ways neuroscience evidence can reduce judges’
implicit bias.73 Examples include neurological testing of a defendant’s
thought processes so a judge can better understand what may have led to that
defendant’s behavior.74 In addition, “individuation” requires judges of
behavior to obtain sufficient information about the person they are assessing
so that they can know that individual’s personal attributes.75
Donald and Bakies conclude by emphasizing that the individuals who gain
the most advantages from neuroscience developments in the criminal justice
system are those who have traumatic childhoods before they get involved in
crime.76 Individualized assessments can explain, in part, these defendants’
behaviors, especially if they experienced repeated traumatic situations,
residence in a dangerous inner-city neighborhood, or a life growing up in
foster care or the welfare system.77 As the authors explain, “neuroscience
offer[s] judges insight into individuals such as these, [and] it can also
facilitate judges’ attempts to counteract implicit biases.”78
Donald and Bakies’s focus on empathy and implicit bias is a fitting segue
to an article on cautionary tales on empathy by Sheri Lynn Johnson, Amelia
Courtney Hritz, Caisa Elizabeth Royer, and John H. Blume.79 The authors
67. Id. at 493.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 494.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 497 (quoting O. Carter Sneed, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital
Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1269 (2007)).
72. Id. (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
73. Id. at 499.
74. Id. at 500.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 502.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Sheri Lynn Johnson et al., When Empathy Bites Back: Cautionary Tales from
Neuroscience for Capital Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 573 (2016).
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explain how biases and stereotypes, specifically about race, can affect a
judge’s or juror’s decision making.80 Likewise, the article introduces a new
way that neuroscience can be used within the sentencing context by revealing
how empathy helps explain how jurors’ identity affects decision making.81
Capital sentencing trials, the authors note, present an inherent conflict:
while prosecutors try to dehumanize defendants before a jury, defense
attorneys try to humanize them.82 One of the primary vehicles for
humanizing a defendant is mitigating evidence, which the Supreme Court has
defined “broadly.”83 Nonetheless, “[s]uch evidence, and the empathy for the
defendant it is intended to create, is perceived as central to persuading jurors
to spare a capital defendant’s life.”84
The concept of empathy, while heavily researched, is still somewhat of a
mystery “and its implications for capital trials are largely unexplored.”85
This is due, in part, to the concept’s differing definitions across studies.86
That said, recent developments in neuroscience have enabled researchers to
investigate various “components” of empathy,87 which the authors define “as
the act of understanding and adopting another’s perspective, either through
affective or cognitive processes.”88
Individuals differ in their ability to empathize. In general, females are
more empathic than males.89 Older individuals (adults aged sixty to eighty)
show higher empathy measures than all other age groups on some tests, but
such results can differ depending on the kind of test being used.90 Individual
differences in the ability to empathize also may predict behavior, thus
showing that an underlying cognitive component of empathy is influenced
by an individual’s attention and motivation.91 Individuals are more empathic
toward those who bear a greater resemblance to them in terms of race, age,
gender, et cetera (their “in-group”), than toward those of differing
characteristics (their “out-group”).92 They also are more apt to dehumanize
and stereotype those they perceive to be in an out-group.93 According to the
authors, courtroom strategies may attempt to fuel the use of stereotypes,
especially racial stereotypes, in an effort to dehumanize the defendant.94
Researchers induce empathy to convey an emotional state in a range of
ways—through facial expressions, bodily movements, mental processes,95 or
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id. at 574–75.
Id. at 575.
Id.
See id. at 576.
Id. at 577–78.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 582.
Id.
Id. at 583.
Id.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 590.
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simply asking a subject to “imagine him- or herself in the other’s place.”96
Yet, the application of this research in the context of capital trials has had
mixed results. As the authors note, in terms of jury selection, “the
neuroscience of empathy is very helpful in explaining how the identity of the
jurors affects decision making, but it is not so helpful in figuring out how to
eliminate the effects of individual differences.”97 Therefore, neuroscience
research “reinforces the importance of vigilant judicial enforcement of
prohibitions against discrimination in jury selection.”98
These findings accentuate a number of problematic practices in death
penalty litigation. First, a detailed voir dire may reveal which jurors are most
empathic; yet courts that have prohibited attorneys from questioning jurors
about their views on particular types of mitigation “thwart the purpose of
individualized sentencing” as well as attorneys’ efforts to select the most
appropriately empathic jurors.99 Research has shown that specificity is
important in this context because “it is more likely to evoke the automatic
affective response.”100 Second, the prosecutor’s presentation of aggravating
evidence that is not relevant specifically to the defendant’s crime may
enhance the probability that the jury will engage in arbitrary decision
making.101 Likewise, the kind of victim-impact statements approved of in
Payne v. Tennessee102 are inappropriate because they potentially encourage
“empathy-induced aggression, for which there is no constitutional
justification.”103 Thus, both mitigating and aggravating evidence should be
specific to the defendant’s case.104
Overall, the authors conclude that the “neuroscience of empathy” reveals
the extent to which decisions to sentence individuals to death are inevitably
arbitrary and influenced by either “race or caprice.”105 Efforts can be made
to diminish the extent of this arbitrariness; yet “we cannot alter basic neural
responses to the pain of others and therefore cannot rationalize (in either
sense of the word) empathic responses.”106
The article by Ruben Gur, along with his coauthors Oren Gur, Alon Gur,
and Arona Gur, shifts the focus from a judicial and juror perspective on
neuroscience to a medical and clinical perspective concerning the
presentation of neuroscience evidence during the sentencing phase.107 The
article emphasizes in particular Ruben Gur’s experience as an expert witness
and the lessons he learned from offering expert testimony on neuroscience in
96. Id. at 591.
97. Id. at 592.
98. Id. at 593.
99. Id. at 594.
100. Id. at 597.
101. Id. at 596.
102. 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the
admissibility of victim impact evidence at a capital sentencing hearing).
103. Johnson et al., supra note 79, at 596.
104. Id. at 595–97.
105. Id. at 598.
106. Id.
107. Ruben C. Gur et al., A Perspective on the Potential Role of Neuroscience in the Court,
85 FORDHAM L. REV. 547 (2016).
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legal cases.108 Gur describes the process he employs to create medical and
scientific reports intended to be used on defendants’ behalf during trials.109
He also discusses how the evidence is treated in the courtroom—specifically,
when and how it is presented, by whom, and for what purpose,110 and what
happens if this evidence is not presented.
Gur and his coauthors begin with a brief history of the association between
the human brain and behavior, the development of phrenology, and a
discussion of early groundbreaking research that contributed to the discovery
that brain lesions can influence different kinds of behaviors according to the
type and location of the damage.111 At the start of the twenty-first century,
neuroscience testimony in courts began to emerge full force in important
Supreme Court decisions, including Atkins v. Virginia112 and Roper v.
Simmons.113 In sync with these decisions, Gur has offered testimony
concerning how certain types of brain damage have the potential to affect
human behavior.114 As the authors explain, while the legal system has long
considered the effects of brain damage on behavior, only recently has a
“rigorously tested brain behavior science” become “increasingly
available.”115 Predictably, some scientists oppose the use of such
neuroscience evidence in court because they feel it is flawed or more
influential than probative;116 yet perhaps the greater impediment for
neuroscientist expert witnesses is that “while more precise and reliable, data
will become increasingly more difficult to understand and, therefore,
explain.”117
Gur’s initial involvement in medical-legal consultation started with his
research in the 1970s using neuroimaging technology to understand behavior
and then his development of the largest normative positron emission
tomography (PET) database at that time.118 This database became the
foundation for Gur’s testimony during a death penalty trial,119 after which he
began receiving referrals primarily from defense attorneys in capital cases
but also from prosecutors in criminal and civil cases involving questions
about the effects of brain damage.120
The authors describe, in detail, the standards that Gur and his team use to
examine the link between behavior and brain function, as well as the
108. See id.
109. Id. at 559–65.
110. Id. at 565–69.
111. Id. at 549–52.
112. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty on individuals with intellectual disabilities).
113. 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see id. at 578 (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
“imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes
were committed”).
114. Gur et al., supra note 107, at 557.
115. Id. at 548.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 557.
119. Id. at 558.
120. Id.
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procedures he and interested lawyers follow to determine if Gur will get
involved in a case.121 Gur and his coauthors conclude with a summary of the
lessons that he and his team have learned over the years about testifying about
neuroscience results.122 For example, while “courts and experts may vary in
their knowledge and understanding of neuroscience methodology,”123 it also
bears emphasizing that “inappropriate dismissal of or failure to introduce
neuroscience evidence pretrial [can produce a domino effect and have] longterm adverse effects on subsequent litigation.”124
Finally, the authors address a number of objections commentators have
offered regarding neuroscience evidence in the courtroom.125 For example,
in response to criticism that such testimony provides “an excuse for violence
by deflecting responsibility from the person to a brain structure,” the authors
emphasize that neuroscience evidence is only one of numerous possible
mitigating factors in a case.126 Regardless of these and other objections, the
authors predict that the role of neuroscience in the legal system will continue
to expand.127
Gur and his coauthors’ forecast concerning the expanding role of
neuroscience is aptly illustrated by Joel Zivot’s examination of the
quandaries that arise when a defendant with a preexisting medical condition
is sentenced to death by lethal injection. This situation thereby creates an
Eighth Amendment issue that reveals a deficiency in our sentencing
procedures.128 In this context, neuroscience research can help to develop a
more informed sentencing system, an approach also advocated by Gertner,
Donald, and Bakies.
Zivot introduces his article with the case of Ernest Johnson, a Missouri
inmate sentenced to death by lethal injection for killing three employees
during a convenience store robbery.129 Johnson, a victim of sexual abuse,
also suffered from a number of other disorders, including an intellectual
disability, fetal alcohol syndrome, traumatic head injury, and a brain tumor
which was only partially removed.130 Zivot’s article concerns the legal and
ethical implications of using lethal injection drugs on Johnson given that the
drugs could cause Johnson to suffer a painful seizure due to his vulnerable
medical condition.131
In the context of this case, Zivot discusses capital punishment generally
and the concept of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 559–65.
Id. at 565–69.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 569–71.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 571.
See Joel Zivot, Too Sick to Be Executed: Shocking Punishment and the Brain, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 697 (2016).
129. Id. at 697.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 701.
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Amendment with respect to execution methods.132 Lethal injection, now the
most pervasive method of execution in the United States, is “never a medical
act” according to Zivot; yet it “co-opts the tools of the medical trade” and
therefore stirs controversy.133
Estelle v. Gamble134 held that indifference to prisoner health constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment and therefore violates the Eighth
Amendment.135 Estelle has been interpreted as upholding a prisoner’s right
to health care, which a warden has a legal duty to provide.136 This obligation
leads to Zivot’s core question: If an inmate dies as a result of a statesanctioned execution, when, if ever, is it appropriate during the execution for
the legal system to set aside the inmate’s healthcare? As Zivot contends,
“[c]apital punishment cannot be brought about as a consequence of
withholding necessary healthcare. Nor can it occur by the infliction of
sublethal injuries that, in the course of time, are expected to worsen and cause
death.”137 Likewise, the state would be obligated to resuscitate any inmate
who survives an execution attempt.138
Missouri death-row inmate Russell Bucklew has serious health issues that
could impede the state’s efforts to execute him by lethal injection.139
Bucklew’s attorneys asked Zivot to examine Bucklew and give his opinion
on Bucklew’s Eighth Amendment stay application concerning the effects of
the lethal injection procedure on Bucklew’s condition.140 According to
Zivot, Bucklew “had a substantial risk of ‘suffering grave adverse events
during the execution, including hemorrhaging, suffocating, and experiencing
excruciating pain.’”141 Justice Alito granted Bucklew’s stay of execution and
Bucklew remains on death row.142
Where do these dilemmas leave Ernest Johnson, another physically
impaired death row inmate? Johnson experiences seizures that seemingly
stem from prior brain trauma and his parafalcine meningioma resection.143
The drugs used during the lethal injection process are barbiturates, which
have the potential to trigger seizures in someone with Johnson’s condition.144
According to Zivot, Johnson’s “medical condition would lead to a seizure at
the time of his execution, resulting in cruel punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.”145 In part as a result of Zivot’s testimony, the Supreme
Court eventually issued Johnson a temporary stay of execution.146
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Johnson’s medical condition presents a dilemma for both the courts and
the medical system. “Lethal injection is not a medical act but approximates
it to a sufficient degree that it compels the involvement of doctors. If a doctor
comments or advises on aspects of execution, he or she risks being sanctioned
or reprimanded by professional medical societies.”147 At the same time, if
states continue to use lethal injection, they will remain plagued by
uncomfortable medical questions. On this matter, Zivot’s stance is clear:
“Between the interests of the state and the interests of the medical profession,
lethal injection does not offer an ethical, halfway compromise.”148
The articles by Zivot and Gur and his coauthors focus on the substance of
their own expert testimony as well as the parameters of mitigating evidence
and the context in which it is used. Deborah Denno’s article continues the
discussion further and concludes the section on sentencing by providing a
detailed description of how and when prosecutors and defense attorneys
present neuroscience evidence and for what purpose.149 Denno’s article takes
an evidence-based and multidisciplinary approach to examining how courts
respond to neuroscience evidence in capital cases when the defense presents
it to argue that the defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime was below
the given legal requisite due to some neurologic or cognitive deficiency.150
The article relies on data from Denno’s Neuroscience Study (“the Study”) to
explore capital cases where the defendant argued for a lower level of mens
rea.151 The Study consists of all criminal law cases (totaling 800) that
addressed neuroscience evidence from January 1, 1992, to December 31,
2012.152 Attorneys can introduce neuroscience evidence either during the
guilt-or-innocence phase, the penalty phase, or both.
In a capital case, “prevailing professional norms” mandate that attorneys
conduct a “thorough investigation” of “all reasonably available mitigating
evidence” pertaining to a defendant’s relevant background and cognitive or
intellectual deficiencies.153 Courts not only expect attorneys to investigate
and use available neuroscience evidence when appropriate but also penalize
them for neglecting to do so. The Study shows that “courts regularly accept
neuroscience evidence to mitigate punishments”154 and that such evidence is
introduced into court nearly exclusively by defense attorneys as a vehicle to
eliminate or mitigate their clients’ punishments, especially in death penalty
cases.155
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Neuroscience evidence, however, is rarely employed by prosecutors in
rebuttal to argue future dangerousness.156 Of the Study’s 553 cases, only 10
cases (all capital murder) involved successful uses by prosecutors of such
evidence.157 Yet, Denno has shown that prosecutors do introduce such
evidence on their own (not in rebuttal).158 When they do, such evidence
nearly always involves the victim rather than the defendant, and it is nearly
exclusively brain scan evidence.159 In addition, one-half of these cases relied
on shaken baby syndrome evidence where the neuroscience diagnosis often
“successfully serves as the sole foundation for a prosecutor’s case; there is
commonly no proof of the defendant’s act or intent, except for the victim’s
brain scan and the accompanying medical expert testimony, because so little
circumstantial evidence is available.”160 This finding not only shows a
prosecutorial use of neuroscience evidence, but a troubling misuse of such
evidence.161
Denno examines further the differences between prosecutors and defense
attorneys in her analysis of thirty-nine capital cases in which neuroscience
evidence was introduced to argue that defendants did not have the requisite
mens rea to commit the crimes for which they were convicted.162 While most
of these cases involved claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, defense
counsel successfully used neuroscience evidence in nearly one quarter of
them.163
However, Denno contends that while courts seem to rely on a wide range
of neuroscience evidence for their determinations in these cases, they lack
sufficient guidance even under the framework of Strickland v.
Washington.164 Instead, the primary guidepost for many of these cases
depends, either explicitly or implicitly, on “double-edged sword” arguments,
which support the view that neuroscience evidence can either be helpful or
hurtful to a defendant depending on how it is being argued.165 According to
Denno, the courts’ emphasis on a double-edged-sword analysis is inadequate
and speculative because courts commonly accept defense counsel’s
justifications for omitting neuroscience evidence when in fact it could well
have helped the defendant in terms of mitigation.166 Courts’ responses also
do not consider the additional kinds of evidentiary complexities involved in
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lesser mens rea decisions assessing neuroscience, most particularly the role
of context in distinguishing between aggravating and mitigating evidence.167
Courts’ differing perspectives on what constitutes mitigating or
aggravating evidence therefore suggest that the “double-edged sword”
framework is simplistic and, at times, misleading.168 Denno sides with the
court in Smith v. Dretke,169 which proposes a “reasonable jurist[]” standard
as well as reliance on professional norms to assess an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim based on neuroscience.170
The article concludes that courts could more effectively apply
neuroscience evidence in intent determinations if they go beyond the doubleedged sword approach and establish a more realistic framework in terms of
the “reasonable jurist[].”171 Neuroscience evidence and better guideposts,
then, can help address questions about a defendant’s level of intent, which lie
at the heart of the criminal law and its system of punishment.172
III. EXPANDING THE USES OF NEUROSCIENCE
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Many scholars see a potential for neuroscience to create positive future
changes within the realm of the criminal law. For instance, neuroscience may
help predict antisocial or violent behavior, advance reform in our correctional
system, provide greater understanding of criminal mens rea and moral
blameworthiness, and prove beneficial to areas of criminal law beyond
mitigation during sentencing. The articles in this part each discuss one or
more ways in which neuroscience can further aid the justice system.
The article by Jane Campbell Moriarty argues that advances in
neuroscience can assist in a greater understanding of criminal mens rea and
moral blameworthiness, which also would bolster the determination of lesser
mens rea arguments along the lines discussed by Denno.173 In addition,
Moriarty believes that neuroscience can improve the approach and use of
other defenses, particularly insanity.174
Moriarty begins her article with the story of an extremely difficult and
taxing patient in a psychiatric hospital.175 After one of the hospital’s doctors
ordered a CT scan, which revealed damage to the patient’s prefrontal cortex,
the nurses tended to blame the patient less for her outbursts.176 As Moriarty
explains, “This state of mind and emotion, where we shift from blaming a
person for behavior to potentially excusing her, is where the historical origins
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of the insanity defense reside within us.”177 Neuroimaging test results that
are both accurate and relevant to legal insanity may encourage “more
rationally premised decision making.”178 Yet, they also reveal complex and
controversial questions179 and considerations of whether, for example,
human behavior should “be reduced to brain states.”180
In general, Moriarty suggests that such images might provide a more
realistic understanding of both mental illness and the effects of traumatic
brain injury in the future, as well as better clarify the relationship between
cognition and behaviors.181 Moriarty’s article, however, “focuses only on
the conception of legal insanity in light of developing neuroscience” rather
than courtroom evidence.182 She suggests that neuroscience might advance
the conception of legal insanity in three ways: (1) by establishing current
medical perspectives of legal insanity according to a “brain science that
complements and possibly refines” observationally based diagnoses, (2) by
better informing and integrating the association “between disordered
thinking and aberrant behavior,” and (3) by illuminating “our moral sense of
blameworthiness.”183
The insanity defense has been heavily criticized for a range of reasons: it
is rarely used or successful and it exists in a “state of chaos” in part because
of restrictive legislation, public disfavor, and a political proclivity to
incarcerate the mentally ill.184 At the same time, research conducted in
neuroscience and other scientific disciplines appears superior in the
“understanding, prediction, diagnosis, and treatment of mental illnesses, such
as schizophrenia.”185 As Moriarty explains, “It is thus an appropriate time,
perhaps, to consider developing neuroscience research and whether it could
inform a reconstruction of legal insanity going forward.”186 Such a
recommendation is particularly timely given Moriarty’s discussion of the
history and current state of the insanity defense and her conclusion that
“whether the insanity defense—in any form—is a constitutionally protected
right is unclear and far from certain.”187 Regardless, a general consensus
remains that the insanity defense serves a vital “jurisprudential role” for
particular individuals.188
In an effort to hone her points, Moriarty provides an overview of various
imaging techniques (x-ray, CT, MRI, fMRI, PET) and selects schizophrenia
as a point of focus.189 She also discusses the frequency of traumatic brain
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injury in the United States190 and what current research and commentary
reveal about the relationship between brain trauma and behavioral control.191
Such an overview fuels her agreement with those who believe there should
be a volitional prong to the insanity defense and that neuroscience may “more
accurately explain the relationship among brain lesions (or illness),
cognition, impulsivity, and behavioral control.”192
Neuroscience can enhance the role of blameworthiness in the criminal law
by offering a stronger and more scientific foundation for diagnoses.
“[N]euroscience may also encourage the judicial system to reject the
stereotypes and myths that have shaped our current insanity defense doctrines
and embrace a more humane way of dealing with the mentally ill and braininjured criminal defendants.”193 Indeed, research evaluating the impact of
neuroscience explanations on defenses pertaining to mens rea and insanity
should highlight the potential for neuroscience to help guide real decision
making regarding insanity determinations. As Moriarty concludes, “The
research on the effects of neuroscientific explanations for the mens rea
defense and the insanity defense demonstrate the positive potential of
neuroscience to improve decision making in response to such defenses.”194
Similar to Moriarty’s article, the article by Elizabeth S. Scott, Richard J.
Bonnie, and Laurence Steinberg discusses important changes in policy that
have been prompted by neuroscience evidence, specifically juvenile
culpability and developmental brain research.195 The article examines what
these neuroscience studies suggest in relation to the culpability of young
adults, contending that there should be a transitional category for young
adults that is distinct from juveniles and adults.196 This transitional category
would allow for more effective sentencing and rehabilitation opportunities
for this group.197
The past decade’s focus on the link between developmental brain research
and crime regulation, especially as it relates to juvenile culpability, has been
associated with a growing rejection by legislatures and courts of a punitive
approach to young offenders.198 As the authors note, four Supreme Court
opinions have dismissed severe adult sentences for juveniles in light of two
empirically based principles: First, because of their cognitive immaturity,
juvenile offenders are generally less culpable and therefore merit less
punishment than adults. Second, because their immaturity is the source of
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their criminality, more juveniles are capable of reforming their behavior
relative to adults.199
Indeed, the past decade’s research also has shown that individuals continue
to mature and develop up to their early twenties, therefore prompting the
question of whether young adult offenders should benefit from the
presumptions of lesser culpability and greater reform potential that are
applied to juveniles.200 Such an approach “would represent a substantial
departure from what has become a commonly recognized boundary in the
justice system between juveniles and adults”—age eighteen.201
Scientific research does not show, however, that youths between eighteen
and twenty-one appear “indistinguishable from younger adolescents in
attributes relevant to criminal offending and punishment.”202 Therefore, the
authors question, “on both scientific and pragmatic grounds,” proposals
suggesting that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction raise its cap to age twentyone.203 That said, there are firm reasons to support some correctional reform,
as young adult offenders can still lead societally productive lives if they are
given the opportunity while they are still developing.204
The authors’ suggestions for reform presume that young adults constitute
a separate category of offenders and therefore merit special sentencing and
parole policies as well as correctional programs geared toward taking on
adult roles.205 In addition, they believe that juvenile correctional and
rehabilitative programs can be tailored for young adults so that they can
receive educational and vocational skill training and other policies directed
toward reducing recidivism.206
The authors reject other proposals for handling young adults. For example,
attempting “a unitary rehabilitative justice system with general jurisdiction
over juveniles and young adults” is too bold a move.207 According to the
authors, young adults will benefit more from institutional reforms in the adult
system than from being relegated to a juvenile status, although juvenile court
jurisdiction could perhaps be somewhat extended in certain circumstances.208
Regardless, adjusting sentencing policies for young adults and contributing
to programs that provide them criminality-free life skills “will serve social
welfare, as well as the interests of the most vulnerable young adults.”209
In addition to aiding in the understanding of moral culpability and
differences in brain development between groups, neuroscience can also be
used to help decipher and predict violence. The article by Lyn M. Gaudet,
Jason P. Kerkmans, Nathaniel E. Anderson, and Kent A. Kiehl focuses on
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the prediction of antisocial behavior, contending that such efforts may help
to reduce recidivism rates by providing a remedy for high-risk behavior
through appropriate treatment.210
In the article’s introduction, the authors ask the following question, which
frames the core of their argument: “If we can get information from
neuroscience techniques, does that information add predictive utility to
understanding and assessing antisocial behavior?”211 They conclude that
current research would “suggest that it does.”212
In an effort to investigate this question, the article begins with a review of
the four categories of factors currently available to predict antisocial behavior
or violence: “dispositional, historical, clinical, and contextual.”213 After
specifying the caveats and varying types of models that could weigh these
factors, the article in turn discusses the different prediction models for
determining future violence and how these models could accommodate
incoming scientific advances.214 These models have a range: (1) “clinical
predictions,” the oldest type of prediction in forensic settings, which typically
use psychiatrists and psychologists;215 (2) “actuarial predictions,” which are
based on longitudinal data and statistics to assess risk and the likelihood that
an individual belongs to a predicted group;216 and (3) “psychological and
personality measures,” which rely on neuropsychological testing and
assessment of psychopathic personality disorder,217 arguably “the single best
predictor of criminal behavior and recidivism.”218
The authors then examine legal precedent concerning the application of
different prediction methods and the challenges to them, primarily through
the use of recidivism rates.219 While some of the methods have been
seriously challenged in court, the article notes that, in a series of three cases,
the Supreme Court has upheld the use of psychiatric testimony for providing
an expert opinion on a defendant’s future dangerousness.220 In light of the
dubious nature of this testimony, the authors emphasize that the “addition of
actuarial tools also could be what distinguishes an assessment of future
dangerousness as sufficiently reliable to pass Daubert [v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.221] in comparison to a pure clinical assessment
alone.”222 One powerful tool is an individual’s brain age, as opposed to their
chronological age.
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The article introduces recent neuroscience research and reviews two
studies that were able to accurately incorporate neuroimaging techniques to
predict recidivism.223 While criticisms are commonly levied against the
various prediction methods, there are also disparities between the attitudes of
the scientific versus legal communities toward risk assessment generally and
neuroscience specifically.224 In addition, the actuarial methods are viable
and ethical only if certain conditions are met: researchers apply the
appropriate techniques and tools,225 have sufficient training,226 and take into
account potential equal protection implications so that offenders are not
wrongly excluded from certain treatment programs that may be particularly
beneficial to them.227
Finally, the authors explain why neuroscience methods are likely to
continue to help inform and, ideally, improve the tools embraced by the
criminal justice system by way of assessing, understanding, and predicting
human behavior.228 The two forensic neuroprediction studies that the article
examines, for example, “provide a strong demonstration of how neuroscience
measures can change the way we think about variables that we already
recognize for their influence on behavior,” including recidivism rates.229 To
remedy recidivism, the United States needs to implement workable measures
that incorporate an understanding of brain structure and function, particularly
in individuals who have been violent or are at high risk for future violence.230
The authors’ belief that neuroscience can serve to improve the justice
system’s approach to treatment is one that is also held by Arielle R. BaskinSommers and Karelle Fonteneau.231 However, Baskin-Sommers and
Fonteneau contend that the courtroom is not the correct setting within the
justice system for the use of neuroscience.232 Instead, neuroscience should
be implemented to reform current policies related to the use of segregation,
the physical surroundings and makeup of the correctional environment, and
inmate treatments.233 Neuroscience can better help criminal defendants in
this way than in the trial or sentencing phases.234
The application of neuroscience in the criminal justice system has recently
taken center stage to help diagnose conditions that may mitigate an inmate’s
responsibility as well as pinpoint those factors that may influence decision
makers in sentencing.235 While some studies have revealed possible neural
correlates of criminal conduct, “there is no discipline-wide consensus on
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those correlates” or their associations to certain types of criminality.236
Rather, neuroscience tests are based on probability assessments: techniques
such as EEGs and brain scans “cannot show beyond a reasonable doubt that
distinct brain structures or abnormalities” impact an individual’s mental state
at the time of the crime or whether that individual will commit future
crimes.237 In addition, neuroscience tests are extremely expensive and
financially inaccessible to many criminal defendants, thereby infusing the
criminal justice system with even more economic disparities among
defendants.238
The authors contend that findings from neuroscience can instead be
applied to enhance correctional settings so that “[s]uch applications bypass
the constraints and requirements of both science and the law without
worsening the disparities that currently exist in the criminal justice
process.”239 For example, solitary confinement, or segregation, pertains to
an individual’s isolation in a prison cell for twenty-two to twenty-four hours
a day.240 Such conditions are severely detrimental to an inmate’s mental and
physical health, and they can cause “persistent emotional trauma and
distress,” as well as hypersensitivity to the environment, hallucinations,
anxiety, depression, and more.241 There have been only a limited number of
human studies on the “underlying mechanisms that produce such
psychopathology.”242 Yet a substantial amount of research on nonhuman
animals has discovered evidence of chemical imbalances in the brain and
cognitive impairment resulting from segregation.243 Some human studies on
individuals raised in institutional settings have demonstrated similar
patterns.244 Thus, neuroscience research points to the abolition of
segregation because of its harmful effects.245
The overall physical surroundings and makeup of general population
settings also negatively influence human behavior and brain functioning. As
the authors note, “Neuroscience can be particularly useful in understanding
the mechanisms that produce such adverse consequences as well as suggest
policies and practices that avoid or counteract these effects.”246 Indeed,
neuroscience research has revealed three factors that are especially damaging
to the brains and behaviors of incarcerated individuals: overcrowding, noise,
and toxins.247 These findings are particularly relevant for correctional
facilities, which suffer from overcrowding, noise pollution, and toxin
exposure resulting from inadequate sewage and waste disposal, poor water
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quality, and other problems.248 But such factors also “have the potential to
negatively impact neural regions responsible for emotion, cognition, and
behavioral control,” as well as the capacity to “worsen already problematic
neural and behavioral tendencies.”249
The authors conclude by calling for a reconceptualization of how
neuroscience is used within the criminal justice system.250 If implemented
appropriately, the kinds of neuroscience findings that the authors discuss “all
have the tremendous potential to affect meaningful—and much needed—
correctional change in the United States today.”251
Erin Murphy’s article bridges the gap between the argument that
neuroscience can be used to improve the sentencing process and BaskinSommers and Fonteneau’s argument that neuroscience instead can be used to
improve correctional facilities and treatment.252 Murphy claims that
neuroscience has the ability to be employed in new settings, such as bail
hearings, competency determinations, and noncapital sentencing.253 If
applied successfully in these ways, neuroscience also may prove more
relevant in civil adjudications as well. Given that neuroscience is constantly
growing and evolving, Murphy’s approach is practical in its belief that the
neuroscience applications will continue to expand to more settings within the
judicial system.
Murphy’s article explores the future admissibility of “novel neuroscience
evidence” in both civil and criminal cases.254 Murphy’s use of the phrase
“novel neuroscience” is meant to “exclude relatively noncontroversial uses
of neuroscience” or the “fairly noncontroversial consequence” as well as
“assessments that have only remote connection to the physical condition of
the brain.”255
As a foundation for her article, Murphy introduces some background to the
Daubert rulings and highlights issues regarding the decision’s applicability
to civil versus criminal cases.256 In essence, there appears to be “a Daubert
double-standard.”257 Murphy points out that in civil cases, courts discuss
“both science and statistics with plenty of acumen,” but in criminal cases,
“courts are unable to muster the most minimal grasp of why a standardless
form of comparison might lack evidentiary reliability or trustworthiness.”258
Such a distinction between the civil and criminal contexts is difficult to
decipher because the two fields often rely on different disciplines for their
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evidence.259 But even when civil and criminal cases both share the same kind
of evidence, courts are more willing to admit evidence for the prosecution
than for plaintiffs in civil cases.260 This outcome supports Murphy’s
“underlying premise: it depends as much on the offering party as it does on
the type of case.”261
Murphy contends that novel neuroscience presents a different kind of
framework because it can provide relevant evidence to all parties involved in
a case.262 In civil cases, novel neuroscientific evidence is generally offered
by plaintiffs to demonstrate a brain injury, support a finding of toxic
encephalopathy, or engage in lie detection.263 In criminal cases, however,
novel neuroscientific evidence is most commonly introduced by the
defendant in death penalty cases for the purpose of mitigation.264 Yet, so far,
courts have been inconsistent in their attitude toward novel neuroscience
even for these purposes.265
While the future of neuroscientific admissibility is unknown, Murphy tells
us to presume two possibilities: (1) claimants, seemingly undaunted, will
persist in proffering such evidence, and courts will keep facing challenges
concerning scientific validity and (2) the science will become ever more valid
and reliable.266 Yet Murphy emphasizes “one significant exception” to the
tendency of courts to resist novel neuroscience evidence: when defendants
in sentencing proceedings offer it.267 She predicts that such an exception
may encourage prosecutors to use novel neuroscience evidence more
frequently and that it may lead to the use of such evidence in the guilt and
pretrial phases as well.268
There is a third possibility that Murphy considers: “[T]he current trend
holds even as prosecutors seek to marshal neuroscientific evidence in support
of their claims. Courts would extend the general skepticism shown to
plaintiffs who offer novel techniques to prosecutors, even while continuing
to carve out a role for the criminal defendant.”269
Novel neuroscience, therefore, presents a point of conflict. Nonetheless,
Murphy believes that it is capable of gaining traction in civil cases as well.270
The evidence will start to become more familiar to judges and the
“novelty . . . may start to wear off.”271 Judges may also develop a greater
sense of the disparities involved with its use—“the notion that neuroscience
is somehow reliable enough for a death sentence determination but not for
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less serious offenses or monetary claims.”272 In addition, judges may start to
consider “such evidence reliable when it confirms other proof, or even their
own intrinsic beliefs about a particular condition, and incline toward a more
generous Daubert or Frye [v. United States273] standard in noncapital or civil
cases.”274
CONCLUSION
This Foreword’s discussion of articles on neuroscience and the law
represents a range of experts who participated in the Fordham Law Review’s
symposium, Criminal Behavior and the Brain: When Law and Neuroscience
Collide (cosponsored by the Fordham Law School Neuroscience and Law
Center). The symposium provided a comprehensive forum on the legal,
scientific, and ethical issues that concern the human brain and behavior. May
this forum inspire other scholarly gatherings on this rapidly evolving topic.
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